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I. INTRODUCTIONIN 1982, the Cuban National Council promulgated Decree Law 50,
which authorized foreign investment on the island for the first time
since the 1959 nationalizations.' At the time, the Foreign Investment
Law went unnoticed by most and had little bearing on the flow of foreign
investment in Cuba. 2 By the early 1990s, however, the business landscape
in Cuba had drastically changed. As a result of the collapse of the Soviet
Union, the Cuban National Assembly moved to amend the national Con-
stitution in 1992,3 which at the time created many obstacles to invest-
ment, to give assurances to potential foreign investors that it was safe to
invest in Cuba. 4 Additional changes followed in 1995 in the form of stat-
utory law that created the institutional infrastructure for foreign direct
investment.5 Commentators in the late 1990s hailed these developments
as a major transformation in Cuba's engagement in the international bus-
iness world that would have revolutionary effects on the closed society.
As of 2009, nearly fifteen years after the most "groundbreaking" laws
were instituted, however, those effects have yet to manifest.
This Article argues that Cuba's so-called "internationalization revolu-
tion" was ill-predicted because it was based on a faulty premise: that the
foreign investment laws of the 1990s constituted a marked shift in Cuba's
engagement in the global marketplace. While there is no doubt that in-
*Kathleen Claussen is a law clerk for the Honorable David Hamilton, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. She received her J.D. from the Yale Law School,
and holds an M.A. from Queen's University Belfast.
1. Decree Law 50, ON ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION AMONG CUBAN AND FOREIGN ENri-
i-iu-s, enacted Feb. 15, 1982 (now codified as Chapter 11 of Decree Law No. 77,
infra note 28).
2. About Foreign Investment in Cuba, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Cuba,
2003, http://www.cubaminrex.cu/english/look-cuba/economy/economy-about%20
foreign%20investment.htm (last visited July 21, 2010).
3. See Claes Brundenius, Whither the Cuban Economy after Recovery? The Reform
Process, Upgrading Strategies and the Question of Transition, 34 J. LATIN AM.
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vestment in Cuba has increased since the implementation of the interna-
tional investment laws, the laws contain little more than a natural
outgrowth of ideas from Cuba's longstanding commitment to commercial
arbitration in both the domestic and international contexts. This Article
reviews the evolution of Cuba's engagement in international arbitration
spheres to demonstrate that the changes of the 1990s could not have had
a major impact on Cuba's political economy. The principal point this Ar-
ticle makes is that aesthetic changes in the domestic legal landscape did
not and could not alter the course of Cuba's external relationships in such
a way as to effect the anticipated major social reform and development.
Recognizing this limitation provides counsel for other closed societies
and transitional economies as to what is important for development.
In Part II, the Article describes the unacknowledged Janus-faced Cu-
ban engagement that far pre-dates the current regime. It contextualizes
this duality in the larger discourse of international commercial and invest-
ment arbitration within the scholarly and practitioner communities. Part
III analyzes the changes of the 1990s and their limitations. Finally, Part
IV provides two comparative case studies to illustrate further alternate
routes Cuba could pursue. The Article's focus on Kosovo-a conflict-
ridden transitional economy that has recently pursued a course of action
similar to the Cuban moves of the 1990s in order to procure investment-
as well as Vietnam, which, like Cuba, remained a closed society long after
the major geopolitical transformation of the 1940s and subjected foreign
investors to waves of privatization and nationalization through the end of
the century.6 This Article concludes that Cuba's foreign engagement
rhetoric of the 1990s was just that: rhetoric lacking the necessary commit-
ment or transformative power to effect the major transformation
expected.7
II. IRONY OF THE CUBAN POSTURE
Cuba's engagement with international arbitral institutions began long
before the wave of legal developments in the 1980s and 1990s. Certainly,
foreign investment was commonplace in Cuba before the revolution of
1959. In 1959, North American investments in Cuba were valued at 700
million dollars.8 Also, contrary to impressions gleaned from the scholarly
work on foreign investment on the island, Cuba established an early tra-
6. See generally Amy L. Chua, The Privatization-Nationalization Cycle: The Link Be-
tween Markets and Ethnicity in Developing Countries, 95 Coi um. L. Rinv. 223
(1995).
7. A brief note about methodology: this paper grows out of a research trip to Cuba
in March 2009. The interviews which inform the conclusions drawn herein were
carried out at the Cuban Jurists Association between March 18 and 20. Those
interviewees who were not comfortable with any citation are cited simply as "In-
terview" along with their profession and the date of the interview. Additional
information about these interviews is on file with the author.
8. James Petras & Robin Eastman-Abaya, Cuba: Continuing Revolution and Contem-
porary Contradictions, Aug. 13, 2007, available at http://dissidentvoice.org/2007/08/
cuba-continuing-revolution-and-contemporary-contradictions/.
LESSONS FROM CUBAN EXPERIENCE
dition of arbitration that helped create a framework on which to build a
foreign investment and commercial legal infrastructure.
In 1965, Cuba signed and ratified the New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9 indicating its
willingness to participate in the global commercial arbitration commu-
nity. Ten years earlier, it signed the European Convention on Interna-
tional Commercial Arbitration.' 0 Internally, the state developed
institutions that were also generally conducive to arbitration. In 1977, the
Cuban government instituted a domestic administrative arbitral tribunal
to relieve the backlog and heighten pressure on the state courts.n The
arbitral tribunal was intended to address disputes between private per-
sons and the state. Because Cuba's Constitution defines the judiciary as a
department under and subservient to the executive, the creation of the
arbitral tribunal added supplementary independence from state control.
Also, in the 1970s, Cuba created a Foreign Trade Arbitration Court of its
own to review cases between foreign companies and their Cuban counter-
parts.12 After 1990, this court became particularly active: from 1990-2005
alone, it settled 478 suits.' 3
Similarly, in the decades that followed, the Cuban government gradu-
ally refined its arbitration laws and joined more regional and interna-
tional networks in support of this already friendly and well-established
engagement. It created a national committee of the International Cham-
ber of Commerce and in many respects has led other Latin American
countries-countries that were once reticent toward arbitration-to es-
tablish their own arbitral institutions.14 In 1980, Cuba was the only state
in the region to conduct and support arbitration (both foreign and domes-
tic) with a comprehensive statute. By 2005, more than twenty Latin
American states had adopted similar laws.15 And in 2007, the Foreign
Trade Arbitration Court became the International Trade Arbitration
Court, with increased functionality, comprised of twenty-one judges and
seven mediators.' 6
Although it was engaged in these arbitral and commercial arrange-
ments throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, the Cuban state
isolated itself from foreign investment during this extended period.' 7 It
was a situs for transnational arbitration but not a recipient of foreign at-
9. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
10. European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Apr. 21, 1961,
484 U.N.T.S. 364.
11. Kevin S. Tuininga, International Commercial Arbitration in Cuba, 22 EMORY INT'L
L. R,-v. 571, 575 (2008).
12. Interview with former prosecutor, in Havana, Cuba (Mar. 19, 2009).
13. Cuba Establishes Arbitration Court, CUBANi~ws, Oct. 1, 2007, available at http://
findarticles.com/p/articles/mi hb5140/is_10_15/ai-n29380237/.
14. Interview with professor and jurist, in Havana, Cuba (Mar. 19, 2009).
15. Tuininga, supra note 11, at 575, n.20.
16. Cuba Establishes Arbitration Court, supra note 13.
17. Venera Gallousis, Note, Cuba's Flirtatious Love Affair With Foreign Investment:
The Evolution of Laws 50, 77, 5 TEx. Hisr,. J.L. & Pot'y 81, 85 (2001).
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tention in that realm. Rather, the absence of the private sector placed a
burden on the state to acquire necessary goods. To fill this gap, Cuba
secured favorable trade and aid agreements with the U.S.S.R. and other
similarly oriented states.18 These state-to-state relationships sustained
the economy throughout the Cold War while private investment was
prohibited.
The duality seen in the Cuban experience manifests a separation be-
tween two bodies of law that are often conflated in the academic litera-
ture and in practice: investment arbitration law and commercial
arbitration law. International arbitrators frequently participate in invest-
ment arbitration proceedings as well as commercial arbitrations, some-
times without much distinction between the legal and customary
principles they apply in either setting. Though this approach is increas-
ingly criticized, it is rarely done so on foundational ideological grounds as
demonstrated by the Cuban experience. Investment arises from distinct
origins with distinct purposes that should be differentiated from those
involved in commercial arbitration. Although they may be procedurally
similar, the principles of law that govern each realm are derived from
separate motivations and thus, the analysis of those principles should
likewise remain discrete.
Further, although a state's engagement in the arbitration community
may indicate a willingness to invite foreign companies to conduct busi-
ness on its territory, that hypothesis again is disproven by Cuba's halfway
invitation. Lucy Katz argues that participation in the arbitration commu-
nity can serve as a bridge for closed or conflict-ridden societies to gain
acceptance in the international community as credible and legitimate
players in the global marketplace.' 9 While that assertion may be true for
some states (Katz cites Cuba as well), it is not a foregone conclusion, as
Katz makes it out to be. Multiple ingredients are required for the type of
acceptance that Katz construes, as shown by the case studies outlined in
Part IV of this Article.
A final ingredient for international engagement that Katz neglects to
identify is a willingness on the part of the state to follow through with its
international commitments. The creation of a successful flow of foreign
direct investment (FDI) is premised not simply on the legal pieces falling
into place. Although participation in arbitral schemes may signal that a
state has the capacity to support the intricacies of the global market, it is
far from a demonstration of the internal infrastructure necessary to pro-
tect and develop foreign investment. There are a variety of push and pull
factors, as we will see in this Article's subsequent Parts, that influence the
volume of the incoming investment. Cuba has failed, or elected not to
activate its pull levers; it has not taken the necessary assertive steps to
attract investment in the areas that are important to the island's residents
18. Id.
19. Lucy V. Katz, How International Arbitration Bridges Global Markets in Transition
Economies, 22 ALTERNArivIis To HIGH Cos-r LITIG. 145, 145 (2004).
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or to its longer-term development. The key is to actively promote the
new infrastructure as it is being developed. Cuba, on the other hand, uses
state sovereignty rhetoric, not uncommon among developing states, as a
justification for maintaining strict state control.20 State control over in-
vestment is still possible at the level of on-the-ground negotiations,
though a state's primary contribution-and where the Cuban state falls
short-should be in the preliminary stages of attraction and cultivation of
potential business relationships.
III. THE FALL OF THE U.S.S.R: NON-SOVIETS
COME TO CUBA
Needless to say, the collapse of the U.S.S.R. and the conversion of the
new countries into capitalist states had an upsetting impact on the Cuban
economy. Before that conversion occurred, Cuba's relationship with the
U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe prevented any investments from private in-
vestors in other states. Their system altered the pricing of everyday items
and major commodities. 21 As Johns notes, "In the absence of standard
prices, Cuba could not integrate its markets with other trading part-
ners." 22 At the time, eighty-one percent of Cuba's exports and eighty-
five percent of its imports came from the U.S.S.R. and its affiliates. 23 In
the early 1990s, suddenly cut off from these sources, three-quarters of the
Cuban market disappeared. 24 As a result, the Cuban government took
steps to facilitate private investment from abroad.
The groundwork had been laid in 1982 when "Decree Law 50 became
the first Cuban law since the revolution to welcome foreign economic
interests." 25 Decree Law 50 expressed Cuba's intention that its financial
system not be isolated: "[T]he economic development of the country re-
quires this type of [foreign] association in certain activities of the country
where the financial resources, prime materials, technology and markets
are not within our reach." 26 Even with the legalization of foreign invest-
ment on the island, it was not until the fall of the U.S.S.R. in 1988 that
external capital began to arrive.
The law with the biggest impact, Decree Law 77, was next approved by
the Cuban National Assembly on September 5, 1995.27 This law author-
ized foreign investment in all sectors, excluding the mainstay areas of
health and educational services and the Armed Forces, where the state
20. See Andrew Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the
Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'l L. 639, 647 (1998).
21. See Melissa Johns, Foreign Investment in Cuba: Assessing the Legal Landscape,
106 BoiurtN MEXICANO D)E DERECH1O COMPARADO 35, 43 (2003), available at
http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/publica/librev/rev/boletin/cont/106/artlart2.pdf.
22. Id. at 43.
23. Id. at 38.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 43.
26. Interview with jurist, in Havana, Cuba (Mar. 20, 2009) (quoting JUAN VEGA,
CUBA: INVERSIONS EXTRANJERAS A PARTIR DE 1995, 10 (1996)).
27. ROBERTO RIVERO, LEGAL PROFILE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CUBA 70 (2001).
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maintained control.28 Decree Law 77 institutionalized the components of
an investment infrastructure, the space for which emerged from the con-
stitutional amendments.
According to Article 12 of Decree Law 77-now the governing law on
these matters-foreign investment is permitted in one of the following
forms: (a) a joint venture, (b) an international economic association con-
tract, or (c) a 100% foreign capital company. 29 Article 3 of Decree Law
77 grants foreign investors full protection from expropriation, except
where permitted by the Constitution. The amended Constitution re-
quires that the Cuban state recognize foreign property (excluding Cuban
land, as discussed infra) belonging to joint enterprises, foreign corpora-
tions, and economic associations and that these entities may use and dis-
pose of property in accordance with Cuban law. Both the Constitution
and Decree Law 77 authorize expropriation of assets only for "public or
social interest" (left undefined) and only with compensation to the
investor.30
In addition to the limited protection on expropriation, Decree Law 77
places restrictions on the range of movement of the investor. All foreign
investments must be authorized by the Executive Committee of the
Council of Ministers or a Commission of the Executive Committee by
way of a formal resolution.31 Since the head of the Council of Ministers
was Fidel Castro and is now Rafil Castro, the decision to privatize has
always come from the top. The law also provides that foreign investment
should be directed to areas where a real necessity for foreign assistance
exists, such as fields of emerging technologies.32 Further, a foreign inves-
tor or joint venture cannot buy land nor hire its own personnel: both of
these activities are monopolized by the state.
Although Decree Law 77 opened many avenues to foreign investment,
as in any state, the domestic legal framework shaping the foreign com-
mercial and investment regulations serves only the limited purpose of
creating access to domestic courts and guidelines for treatment that can
be enforced by those domestic courts.33 To the intended audience-a for-
eign corporation-such laws only get it so far. The corporation is limited
to adjudication within the state's parameters. In many states, including
Cuba, access to the domestic courts may not provide much assurance at
all. Where domestic courts are known for their corruption or their bias in
favor of the state, a statutory framework adds little incentive for a foreign
investor.
28. Law on Foreign Investment, Decree Law No. 77, Ch. IV, Art. 10 (Sept. 4, 1995)
(Cuba), available at http://www.cubaindustria.culEnglish/law_77.htm.
29. Id. Ch. V, Art. 12.
30. Id. Ch. III, Art. 3.
31. RiviEito, supra note 27, at 70.
32. Decree Law 77, supra note 28, Ch. VII.
33. Of course, the law is not able to address other exogenous factors such as those
identified by Jorge P6rez-L6pez, including a weak economy and foreign sanctions.
See Jorge F. P6tez-L6pez, Foreign Investment in Socialist Cuba: Significance and
Prospects, 31 S-ruD. CoMr. lrrr'i DEv. 3 (1997).
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The real teeth of the foreign investment framework on behalf of any
state can be found in the bilateral and multilateral agreements the state
concludes with other states. These agreements provide a means by which
a foreign corporation can protect its rights in an independent arbitral in-
stitution such as the International Center for the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes, the American Arbitration Association International
Dispute Resolution Center, the International Chamber of Commerce, or
the London Court of International Arbitration, among others.
Since the early 1990s, Cuba has carried out forty-two bilateral invest-
ment treaties (BITs) with states on four continents. 3 4 These treaties en-
sure protection for investors against expropriation and unfair treatment
in their interactions with Cuba's extensive regulatory system.
Not unsurprisingly, the majority of Cuba's foreign investors come from
states with which Cuba maintains a BIT.3 5 And although most commen-
tators have traced a general rise in investments on the island since the
FDI laws of the early 1990s and have attributed the rise to the laws them-
selves, the more interesting and more telling correlation can be derived
from comparing the timing of investments with the timing of the BITs
carried out by the Cuban government with foreign states. In 1988, only
one foreign investor was reported by the Cuban state, by 1993, that num-
ber increased to 31; by 1997, there were over 260 and by 2000 there were
over 400.36 Most of the Cuban BITs currently in force were concluded
during the second half of the 1990s.
The BITs do not wholly protect the investor from expropriation. Most
of the Cuban BITs authorize the state to expropriate for the "public util-
ity and social interest."37 One professor and foreign investment law
scholar at the University of Havana has called this expropriation clause
"nothing new or strange."38 Rather, he and other Cuban jurists argue,
such a right is derived from the sovereign right of a state and exists in all
world governments.39 Indeed, recently concluded BITs by other states,
including the one concluded by the United States, include similar lan-
34. The states are: Algeria, Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Belgium, Bulgaria, Bolivia,
Brazil, Cape Verde Islands, Colombia, Chile, China, Dominican Republic, Ecua-
dor, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Hungary, Indonesia,
Italy, Jamaica, Laos, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mongolia, Namibia, the Netherlands,
Panama, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Suriname,
Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Venezuela
and Vietnam. See International Database of Investment Treaties, Cuba, http://ic-
sid.worldbank.org/CSID/FrontServlet (last visited Aug. 7, 2010).
35. Among the major contributors, as of 2000, twenty percent of Cuban foreign invest-
ment came from Spain, nineteen percent from Canada (a non-BIT state), nine
percent from Italy, four percent from France, 3.5% from the UK, and 3.5% from
Mexico (a second non-BIT state). Tuininga, supra note 11, at 579.
36. Interview with professor and jurist, supra note 14.
37. Agreement between the United Mexican States and the Republic of Cuba for the
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Mex.-Cuba, May 30, 2001,
2281 U.N.T.S. 40599, available at http://untreaty.un.org/unts/144078 158780/7/5/
14361.pdf.
38. Interview with professor and jurist, supra note 14.
39. Id.
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guage authorizing expropriation "for a public purpose," as long as other
conditions are also satisfied. 40
The investments that have grown out of the BITs have focused on par-
ticular industries. Although it is nowhere codified, it is a widely under-
stood practice among those who invest on the island that investment is
restricted to key areas. The government has embraced projects that meet
its concerns. In turn, the way is smooth for those investments. The result
has been sharp rises in telecommunications investment, mining, and
tourism. 41
IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MOVE FROM MAKING
ARBITRATION AVAILABLE TO ACTIVE
SOLICITATION OF INVESTMENT
Cuba is not the only state of its kind. While unique in many respects, it
shares certain features with other post-Soviet socialist political econo-
mies. The experience it is undergoing to broaden its investment portfolio
is common among developing countries. In particular, newly minted de-
mocracies and emerging markets are particularly apt for a comparison
with the Cuban experience. In this Part of the Article, I have chosen to
focus on two case studies: Kosovo and Vietnam. Although vastly differ-
ent in many respects, they each have undergone the transition to open
their doors to international investment as Cuba has since the 1980s. From
this comparison we can take away lessons for how to interpret and make
use of observations in Cuba for future transitional economies, as well as
for how Cuba might accelerate its own transition in light of others'
experiences.
A. Kosovo
The history of the Kosovar conflict is well known. When the conflict
ended in 1999 and the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) for-
mally took over governance responsibilities, 42 there was little to sustain
the battered Kosovar economy. It was expected that it would take an-
other decade before the state could rebuild and recreate the rule of law.4 3
Beginning in 2006, the international territorial administration in Ko-
sovo began to create avenues for the region to pursue foreign investment
even before it became a state. The April 2006 Law on Foreign Invest-
ment pre-dated the 2008 Declaration of Independence, but it constituted
the first step in a series allowing Kosovo to cultivate investment, it was
hoped, in order to increase the quality of life and bring the region out of
40. See, e.g., Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Republic of Rwanda concerning the encouragement and recip-
rocal protection of investment, Feb. 18, 2008.
41. Johns, supra note 21.
42. See S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999).
43. At the time, no one knew what the fate would be, although in retrospect many
American politicians have argued that the answer was clear from the start: Kosovo
would eventually become an independent state.
LESSONS FROM CUBAN EXPERIENCE
conflict.44 Juxtaposing the story of Kosovo with the Cuban experience
provides some clues regarding what the critical elements of a transitional
economy in a globalized marketplace might be.
Kosovo and Cuba differ in many respects-but not enough to render
the comparison futile. Although Cuba is about ten times the size of Ko-
sovo in both area and population,45 their distinct approaches to inducing
foreign investment are shaped more by factors other than the differences
in their demographics. It is striking that even though the resources are
far richer in Cuba than in Kosovo (e.g., oil exploration prospects are very
high off the Cuban coast), and even though Cuba is a recognized state, it
is less sought after as a situs for investment although both economies are
equally weak.46 Investment in Kosovo is slow as well, but the accelera-
tion in just two years far exceeds the progress made in Cuba since 1995.
What else makes Kosovo distinct? Two key features: (1) location and (2)
marketing, have contributed significantly to the success of investment
there.
Regarding location, Kosovo is part of Europe and is eager to reassert
itself in its neighborhood. The long-troubled history and geographic iso-
lation of Cuba, on the other hand, leaves it seemingly homeless when it
comes to a natural regional affiliation. Kosovo's investment partners all
come from its European neighborhood: Germany, the United Kingdom,
Slovenia, France, Greece, Italy, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, Swit-
zerland, and Norway. Even without being a universally recognized state,
Kosovo has been given a special status allowing it to participate in re-
gional partnerships such as the one created by the Central European Free
Trade Agreement ("CEFTA").47
Second, the marketing campaign surrounding Kosovo's development
and investment opportunities has been the most marked difference from
the Cuban approach to investment. Beyond carrying out BITs, Cuba has
remained a passive player in the investment sphere. Kosovo, on the other
hand, has an aggressive marketing campaign-not carried out by the
quasi-state, but rather by independent, nongovernmental organizations.48
Conferences, RFPs, mass media-the nongovernmental community has
rallied foreign investors in the region. Further, the European Union and
its affiliates have mobilized additional support in order to permanently
bring the larger Balkan region into the Union and stabilize them gener-
44. Soren Jessen-Petersen, Regulation No. 2006/28, UNITED NATIONS INTERIM AD-
MINISTRATION MISSION IN Kosovo, Apr. 28, 2006, available at http://www.un-
mikonline.org/regulations/unmikgazette/02english/E2006regs/RE2006_28.pdf.
45. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Kosovo, https://www.cia.gov/li-
brary/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kv.html (last visited July 24, 2010).
46. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Cuba, https://www.cia.gov/li-
brary/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cu.html (last visited July 24, 2010).
47. Central European Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 21, 1992, available at http://www.
worldtradelaw.net/fta/agreements/cefta.pdf.
48. Economic Initiative for Kosovo, www.eciks.org/english/invest.php?action=totalin-
vest&main-id=11 (last visited July 24, 2010).
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ally.49 The result: substantial capital entering the area and regenerating
entrepreneurship in the region. The establishment of a handful of inves-
tors sets a tone of stability and support for additional investors to follow.
Many of the investments instituted in Kosovo are directly supported by
the governments themselves. In this way, investment in Kosovo is not
only a business endeavor, but is also a governmental aid operation to
enrich a conflict-ridden zone. Cuba marshals no such aid movement.
B. VIETNAM
Halfway around the world and far larger than Kosovo's 10,000 square
kilometers of area, is the 329,000 square kilometers of Vietnam.50 With a
population of eighty-seven million inhabitants, it dwarfs Cuba's eleven
million.5' This study is not the first to compare features of Vietnam with
those of Cuba; however, it draws a distinct lesson from previous work.
Vietnam, like Kosovo, though on a lesser scale, has distinguished itself as
a player in the global marketplace and therefore a country safe for invest-
ment from abroad.
By the late 1980s, Vietnam had already begun efforts toward economic
reform: "Since first promulgating a relatively liberal foreign investment
law in 1987, Vietnam has been very successful in attracting FDI inflows
into this developing, transitional economy." 52 Prior to both Kosovo and
Cuba, Vietnam took measures to market its reform and joined regional
free trade associations. As a result, beginning in the early 1990s, FDI
picked up as Vietnam instituted the legal modifications necessary to ac-
commodate an investment regime.53
As Freeman notes, "By the end of the 1990s, although foreign-invested
companies employed less than one percent of the total workforce in Viet-
nam, they cumulatively accounted for around twenty-seven percent of the
country's (non-oil) exports and thirty-five percent of the country's total
industrial output."54 Foreign investors constituted almost thirteen per-
cent of Vietnam's GDP and contributed around twenty-five percent of
total tax revenues.55 Thus, it is unsurprising that FDI is regarded as one
of the most prominent elements of Vietnam's economic transition.56
Within Vietnam, foreign investor appetite was stimulated by the poten-
tial of the transitional economy and its market of over seventy million
49. See generally European Stability Initiative, http://www.esiweb.org/ (last visited
Aug. 17, 2010).
50. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Kosovo, supra note 45; The
World Factbook: Vietnam, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/vm.html (last visited July 24, 2010).
51. The World Factbook: Cuba, supra note 46.
52. NICK J. FRiEMAN, FOREIGN DIREcr INvI-sTMENT IN VIET[NAM: AN OVERVIn w, 3
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people. But these alone did not carry the day; like the European support
shown for Kosovo, the stable regional configuration in which Vietnam is
situated created an understanding of safety and reliability in the Asian
market. As FDI increased around the world and money was injected into
emerging markets, Southeast Asia was a major beneficiary of this capital
flow.57
The days of the FDI upswing are long gone and even Vietnam is now
encountering diminishing returns for its legal and regulatory reforms.58
Even before the turn of the century, the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development noted that, "diminishing returns ha[ve] set in
[for the liberalization of FDI frameworks] and liberal FDI policy is in-
creasingly losing its effectiveness as a locational determinant of FDI."59
The laws create a platform in which these previously closed or conflict-
ridden societies could entertain foreign investment, but they are not
enough. Across the world, "adequate core FDI policies are now simply
taken for granted." 60 At the same time, "international business activity,
including global patterns of foreign investment activity, has been under-
going . . . significant transformation": companies are becoming increas-
ingly specialized in what they produce, which means that there are fewer
entrepreneurial investments or large scale greenfield projects-once the
backbone of developing country economies-where new production ca-
pacity is created.61 Indeed, conventional greenfield FDI activity was for-
merly the most popular type of investment in all three areas studied
here-Vietnam, Kosovo, and Cuba. It has not been vigorous in recent
years in any of the three, as "global over-capacity" has made companies
reluctant to enact new projects. 6 2 Instead, "cross-border merger and ac-
quisition activity has become a new engine of FDI flows in recent years,
as companies seek to grow."63
By describing the tapering off of FDI flows in this way, I do not mean
to suggest that all FDI is positive for transitional economies by any
means. In fact, FDI can play the role of a substitute private sector, akin
to a gray market, for a transitional economy. In this way, the flows of
capital channeled through the "foreign" sector could distort development
and strong foreign investment could become undesirable. Some indus-
tries, such as the tourist industry, have had this effect on emergent de-
mocracies in attractive places. In both Cuba and Vietnam, tourism has
been both a blessing and, in some respects, a curse. 64 It has led to major
57. LE DONG DOANI, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN VIET NAM: RESULTS,
ACHIEVEMENTS, CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS, 2-4 (2002), available at http://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/seminar/2002/fdileng/pdf/doanh.pdf.
58. FREEMAN, supra note 52, at 11.
59. UNCTAD, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1998, xxvi-xxvii, (1998), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir98_en.pdf.
60. Id.
61. FREEMAN, supra note 52, at 9-10.
62. Id. at 101; Interview with professor and jurist, supra note 14.
63. FREEMAN, supra note 52, at 10.
64. Interview with jurist, supra note 14; DOANH, supra note 57, at 7-8.
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distortions in each of their economies and caused their otherwise incre-
mental development paths to become erratic and dependent on uncon-
trollable variables influencing the tourism industry.65
What remains constant in each case is the way in which foreign investor
sentiment has proved to be the key determinant of FDI flow. During the
1990s, as investor perception steadily increased in Vietnam as a result of
its strategic marketing and regional placement, it flourished. 66 Investor
sentiment in Kosovo has plateaued somewhat as progress toward inde-
pendence remains halted by Russian and Chinese opposition to the idea
that it would set a precedent for other breakaway regions. This stalemate
has stymied marketers' efforts to engage a broader range of global actors
in business projects in the province. Cuba's investor sentiment has al-
ways been low for the reasons discussed above. While undoubtedly the
history and political situation in Cuba has contributed to this low esteem,
the lack of engagement by the Cuban government or any intermediary
agent or advocate on its behalf has exacerbated and perpetuated its
underperformance.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR TRANSITIONS OF ALL TYPES
The aforementioned case studies teach many lessons about what has
and has not worked for states transitioning from conflict or different
forms of government to a more open capitalist model market. At the
same time, some lessons are limited to the unique experience and history
of one particular place and are subject to the whims of international cur-
rents. Worldwide, FDI has grown at an unprecedented rate. Andrew
Guzman notes that between 1986 and 1990 alone:
[T]otal world FDI flows increased from $88 billion dollars to $234
billion, representing an average rate of increase of twenty-six percent
in nominal terms and eighteen percent in real terms. From 1980 to
1993, the stock of foreign investment increased at an average annual
rate of eleven percent in real terms, reaching a total of $2.1 trillion in
1993.67
A significant proportion of FDI is directed at developing countries (as
much as $90.3 billion in 1995),68 though among these states, competition
is rigorous and some states, or sectors within states, that have failed to be
assertive have lost their opportunity to benefit.
One example of a missed opportunity is that of Cuba's renowned sugar
industry, which-in theory and according to Cuban law-has been open
65. Interview with jurist, supra note 14.
66. Nick J. Freeman, Foreign Direct Investment in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam: A
Regional Overview, conference paper, Int'l Monetary Fund Conference on Foreign
Direct Investment, Hanoi, Aug. 16-17, 2002, 1, 7, available at http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/seminar/2002/fdilenglpdf/freema.pdf.
67. Guzman, supra note 20, at 640-41.
68. Id. at 641.
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to direct investment since the 1990s. 6 9 "In practice, however, there has
been no interest up to now on the government's part except in a few
derivatives and mechanical ventures." 70 The Cuban government shut
down and dismantled seventy-one of 156 state-owned mills in 2003 when
raw sugar prices were down; the state needed to make a sharp turn to
take advantage of the rise in the price by 2006.71 A year later, out of
necessity, news reports announcing that Cuba may accept more foreign
investment in agriculture to reduce food imports led U.S. agriculturalists
to lobby the U.S. Congress to support a removal of the ban on trade
between companies in the United States and Cuba. 72 This active recruit-
ment of investment in a critical sector ("Cuba imports hundreds of
thousands of tons of rice, soy products, wheat, corn and other bulk foods
annually"-up to two billion dollars worth)73 led to new ventures from
investors in "Argentina, Venezuela and other Latin American [countries]
as well as European countries." 74
Lacking the extensive economic advising provided to Kosovo, Cuba
has had a difficult time catalyzing its economy into productive realms.
"Cuba owes over $9 billion to international private lenders and has de-
faulted on its loan obligations."7 5 Cuba also owes Russia about thirty
billion dollars in loans outstanding from the 1990s and even earlier. 76
Only Spain and France give Cuba export credits.7 7 Because it is not a
member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Cuba's ability to se-
cure credit from the world's financial institutions is severely limited. This
restricts both the number of investors that can work with Cuba on invest-
ment projects and the scope of the projects that can be undertaken. Fur-
ther, Cuba's agricultural dependency on foreign capital, as noted above,
could present many opportunities for engagement; but beyond the lim-
ited sectors where pleas for investment have been issued in times of crisis,
the government has not taken the necessary non-legal steps. There are
both old and new industries where this assertiveness will be (some would
say already is) essential: agriculture, manufacturing, and applied informa-
tion systems.
The most obvious-or perhaps the least obvious (depending on the po-
litical climate)-audience for simple recruitment of "foreign" investors is
the broad Cuban diaspora. Although many Cubans live in the United
States and therefore would be unable to invest, displaced Cubans places
69. Marc Frank, Cuba Seeking Foreign Investment in Sugar Industry, REUTERS, Apr.
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all over the world should be prime candidates to be targeted by the Cu-
ban government and investor marketing arms. Yet, as one interviewee
put it, "we want that investment to come in a way that secures our inde-
pendence and maintains our sovereignty."78 To invite investments that
challenge the lifestyle and the ideology of Cuban society, including those
that might bring in Cuban defectors, would put the entire enterprise at
risk. "'No,' said one interviewee, 'we strive to protect the dignity of our
people.'""
VI. CONCLUSION
Cuba's engagement with the global marketplace is longstanding;
equally was it on the front lines of the BIT movement as well. "Particu-
larly telling is the diversity of sectors this growth represents; oil and gas
have taken on new importance as exports and tourism earnings now ex-
ceed those from sugar."80 In fact, "[d]irect employment generation and
increased productivity levels from foreign direct investment have led to
140,000 new jobs since 1995."81
Despite criticism of Cuba for rejecting international commercialism,
Cuba has actually been ahead of, or directly in step with, the curve. The
international community has witnessed a fundamental change in the regu-
lation of foreign investment over forty years.82 BITs have become the
dominant vehicle through which investment is regulated under interna-
tional law. As of the summer of 1996, there were 1,010 BITs in existence
around the globe,83 more than half of which have been signed or brought
into force since the start of 1990.84 The number of countries that have
signed at least one BIT has reached 149 (including some countries which
have ceased to exist, such as the U.S.S.R.), leaving very few countries
without any such treaties.85 Cuba's engagement with BITs moved in
lock-step with this trend. In fact, tourism-Cuba's largest industry-grew
out of foreign investments that began as early as 1987.86
78. Interview with former prosecutor, supra note 12.
79. Id.
80. Johns, supra note 21, at 8.
81. Id.
82. One commentator has observed that "[a]part from the use of force, no subject of
international law seems to have aroused as much debate-and often strong feel-
ings-as the question of the standard for payment of compensation when foreign
property is expropriated." Oscar Schachter, Compensation for Expropriation, 78
Am. J. INr'L L. 121, 121 (1984).
83. See Recent Actions Regarding Treaties to Which the United States is Not a Party, 35
wr'i_ Lic,. MATERIALS 1130 (1996).
84. Id.
85. Id. The countries without any BITs include Botswana, Guatemala, Ireland,
Mozambique, Myanmar, and Suriname.
86. At the time it was estimated that for every dollar invested, there would be a sixty-
two percent rate of return. See generally Matias F. Travieso-Diaz & Charles P.
Trumbull IV, Foreign Investment in Cuba: Prospects and Perils, Cuba in Transition:
Association for Study of the Cuban Economy (ASCE) vol. 12, Aug. 1-3, 2002,
available at http://lanic.utexas.edu/project/asce/pdfs/volumel2/travieso.pdf.
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Yet, in spite of its tempered participation, Cuba has not experienced
the growth that its peers have. Other closed and transitional societies
followed the same steps Cuba has, with two major exceptions. The first
exceptional characteristic-strategic geographic location-is immutable;
however, the second-assertive and targeted marketing-is an approach
the Cuban government has not pursued, to its detriment. Thus, the pro-
mulgation of foreign investment laws that create a framework for invest-
ment is not enough. There was no reason to expect growth or social
revolution from the Cuban foreign investment laws. Cuba has to "kick it
up a notch" to attract the resources it needs to grow its economy. Until
that time, investment may or may not continue as a mere trickle of its full
potential.
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